

# **SANITIZED COPY FOLLOWS**

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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**June 19, 1973**

**Dear Mr. Huang:**

**Attached are the three paragraphs from the remarks last evening which Dr. Kissinger said he would provide to you.**

**Sincerely,**

**Brent Scowcroft  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs**

**His Excellency  
Huang Chen  
Chief of the Liaison Office  
of the People's Republic of China  
The Mayflower Hotel  
Washington, D. C.**

**Gen S/lds/6-19-73**

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

But there are other comments, too. There are some who are attempting to cast aspersions on these efforts of our two countries. They are interpreting this noble cause as if the Soviet Union and the United States, should they adjust their relations and put them on a peaceful track, will begin to impose their will upon other nations, and dictate some conditions to someone, and so on.

There is only one thing to be said on that score: in allegations of that kind there is surely not a single grain of truth. It must be absolutely clear to anyone who is at least slightly familiar with the real course of events, and with the real nature of the development of Soviet-American relations, that their improvement in no way prejudices the interests of any third country.

Naturally, the development of good relations between the USSR and the USA will have, and already has, no small a bearing on world affairs. But this influence is of an entirely different nature. It promotes the strengthening of peace, security and international cooperation. In building through joint effort a new structure of peaceful relations, we have no intention of turning it into a secluded mansion completely fenced off from the outside world. We want to keep this spacious edifice open to all those who cherish the peace and well-being of mankind.

*Huang Chen 6/19/73*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1973

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been following the discussions between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang Chen with great attention and I have also studied the notes that have been sent to us by the Chinese Government with respect to the proposed draft agreement. As you know, we differ in our assessment of the consequences of the agreement, though not in the purposes it is supposed to serve. It remains our view that this agreement confers no special rights on the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- and we would oppose any such claim. On the other hand, there is no way recourse to force can be initiated by the U.S.S.R. without violating this agreement and thus creating a legal basis for resistance. As we have told your representatives and also other governments we intend to use this agreement to obtain greater scope for actions in areas not now covered by formal obligations.

Whatever our disagreement as to tactics, I want to use this occasion to tell you formally that the U.S. will oppose a policy that aims at hegemony or seeks to bring about the isolation of the People's Republic of China. For this reason Dr. Kissinger has assured Ambassador Huang Chen on my behalf that the U.S. will not change its vote at the United Nations on the issue of the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

I understand the hesitation of the Chinese side to sign a formal declaration along the lines proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29. Let me, therefore, state our policy unilaterally: The U.S. will not engage in consultations that could affect the interests of the People's Republic of China without a full prior discussion with the Chinese Government. Specifically,

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any consultation under Article 4 of the agreement will be fully discussed with the Chinese Government before it is initiated and will not be concluded before the Chinese Government has an opportunity to express its view. In no case will the U.S. participate in a joint move together with the Soviet Union under this agreement with respect to conflicts or disputes where the People's Republic of China is a party.

Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to repeat our opposition to hegemony and our readiness for full consultation publicly on the occasion of his visit in August if the Chinese Government should consider it appropriate.

I recognize that the Chinese Government will reserve the right to express its views on this agreement. I hope, however, that it will do so in a manner that will not complicate the fixed course of the U.S. policy which is to oppose hegemonial aspirations no matter what their pretext.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard Nixon", written in a cursive style.

Chou En-lai  
Premier of the State Council of  
the People's Republic of China  
Peking

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE  
UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(draft)

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and  
the People's Republic of China have agreed as follows:

Article I

The contracting parties undertake not to commit  
aggression, or resort to threat of aggression, against  
each other with any kind of weapons on land, on sea or  
in the air.

Article II

The present treaty does not affect the rights  
and obligations derived from bilateral and multilateral  
treaties and agreements concluded by the two contracting  
parties.

Article III

The treaty remains valid for a period of 20 years  
as from the date of its coming into force. Upon its  
expiration, the two parties shall hold discussions on  
the extension of the present treaty.

Article IV

The present treaty is subject to ratification.  
The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall



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be done in .....

For the Union of the Soviet  
Socialist Republics

For the People's Republic  
of China

The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK), with the encouragement and support of the United States, has initiated a major review of its foreign policy, particularly regarding the role of the United Nations on the Korean Peninsula, its relations with North Korea, and its dealings with the other major powers. Once this review has been completed, the leadership of the Republic of Korea will state publicly its reconsidered positions. We anticipate such a public statement in the near future.

For its part, the United States is recommending to the Republic of Korea and will lend its support for the following specific policies:

-- The United States will not attempt to forestall a debate on the Korean issue in the 28th session of the UN General Assembly this fall, or object to the participation of North Korea in such a debate in an observer status. The United States will use its influence to insure that any such debate will not be acrimonious, but will contribute to an orderly and constructive evolution of the Korean situation.

-- As indicated in a previous message, the United States is prepared to urge the termination of UNCURK, or ~~at least~~ the suspension of its functions, with the proviso that such termination or suspension would be without prejudice to UNCURK's past activities.

-- Following the 28th session of the UN General Assembly, the United States will be prepared to discuss ways in which the question of the UN Command might be resolved, with the understanding that any adjustment of security arrangements will not result in a diminution of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

-- With regard to both nongovernmental and governmental contacts with North Korea, including the matter of diplomatic recognition, the United States is prepared to move forward as far in its dealings with North Korea as the Chinese side is prepared to move in its contacts with the Republic of Korea. Our objective is to see the evolution of a balance in the international positions of the two Korean governments.

-- The United States will support and encourage the ROK to seek negotiated solutions to future military and political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea in the context of the North-South talks.

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The U.S. side presents these policy positions to the Chinese side in confidence. We have reason to believe that these guidelines, for the most part, will be acceptable to the ROK. We hope that the Chinese side will use its influence with its allies to insure that discussions between the two Korean governments regarding the future of the Peninsula evolve in a constructive manner, and that any UN debate or actions will contribute to an orderly resolution of the Korean issue.

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## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison  
Office, Washington  
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office  
Chi Chiao-chu, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Operations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

## DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, June 19, 1973  
10:00 - 10:50 a.m.

## PLACE:

Dr. Kissinger's Office  
The White House

Huang Chen: You are very busy.

Dr. Kissinger: With your allies here! We took out three paragraphs of a speech he wanted to make last night. I will show them to you. [These were later delivered to the Ambassador. Tab A] He wanted to attack countries who were opposed to the improvement of US-Soviet relations, because it showed warlike intentions. We told him he couldn't criticize third countries in the White House.

[Dr. Kissinger then hands over an autographed picture of the President and Huang Chen, signed by the President.]

Huang Chen: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: We have yesterday asked Ambassador Bruce to request an appointment with the Prime Minister, and we have asked him to deliver a letter to the Prime Minister, which we telegraphed to him. And I wanted to give you the original of the letter. Why don't you read it? And if you have any questions, I can explain it to you. [He hands over the letter at Tab B.]

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The Ambassador examines it. ]

I knew the Ambassador was learning English!

Huang Chen: It is progressing slowly.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, really. How is your search for a house coming?

Huang Chen: Han Hsu can tell you.

Han Hsu: We have been looking at a large building and apartment house north of 16th Street.

Dr. Kissinger: Near the Soviet Embassy!

Han Hsu: No, much further north. Past the bridge.

[Chi then translates the letter for the Ambassador.]

Dr. Kissinger: Notice I am on a one-man campaign to change the Premier's title [to Prime Minister]. It is because I can't pronounce Premier. It is the Assistant Minister's fault; he gave him the title in Yenan. [Chi translates the letter.] And we have asked Ambassador Bruce to hand the telegraphic copy to the Prime Minister. We sent it last night. In case he has any questions.

But I think we have stated our policy here quite clearly.

Huang Chen: It is very clear.

Dr. Kissinger: And we consider that an obligation.

Huang Chen: And I believe Ambassador Bruce will see the Premier today.

Dr. Kissinger: I am amazed by your communications. I cannot find out what Eagleburger does in 24 hours.

Huang Chen: Your communications are very rapid.

Dr. Kissinger: Yours seems to be extremely efficient. Another thing that impresses me in China is that one is in a continuous conversation. Anything one says--first of all, the Prime Minister knows about it, and second, it is likely to be answered by another Chinese. [Laughter]

Huang Chen: We have the practice of what you call briefing. Don't you have

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this, this briefing of correspondents?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we don't do it so elegantly. Once, when I first took Jenkins there, the Prime Minister came to visit the Guest House within one-half hour of our arrival, and he already knew about the house Jenkins had stayed in twenty years ago and whether it was still standing.

When I write my biography, I will ask for the Chinese file on me. It is probably better than my own.

Huang Chen: If Dr. Kissinger agrees, I would like to give you a message from our Government. [Tab C]

Dr. Kissinger: If I don't like it I won't give you this one! [referring to UNCURK note in his hand]

[The Ambassador hands over the note at Tab C, and Dr. Kissinger reads it.]

Dr. Kissinger: They are doing to you what they are trying to do to us.

We appreciate the communication. And it is within the spirit of our mutual consultation. And I will keep you fully informed about our discussions here, and I will talk to you in a minute about them.

I have a paper on the Korean situation. [He hands over note on UNCURK/UNC at Tab D.] Let me fix one word. [He takes it back, crosses out phrase in fourth paragraph] It is not "at least."

[Chi translates the note for the Ambassador.]

Specifically, Mr. Ambassador, to make it slightly more concrete, we are prepared to bring about the termination of UNCURK during the 1973 UN General Assembly and the United Nations Command by the session of the 1974 General Assembly.

Han Hsu: You handed us another note on the 14th. This one is more specific.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. This is an elaboration of the other one. The other one was more preliminary.

Also, we have reason to believe the Seoul Government would be prepared to establish some contacts with your government, and if we can be helpful in this respect we are willing to do this. At the same time, to the extent, that you have contacts with Seoul, we are prepared to have this with Pyongyang.

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Huang Chen: We will report this to our Government.

What you said about the termination of UNCURK this year and of the UNC next year, it is not in here [in the note].

Dr. Kissinger: It is an elaboration. And we will encourage the Government of South Korea to make some of these proposals publicly, in the near future. Not about the United Nations Command.

One other matter, about Senator Mansfield's visit to the People's Republic. Everything being equal, we would prefer it if he came after I have been to Peking.

Huang Chen: That is up to you, to your convenience.

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to your skill in managing. You can do it more tactfully than I can!

Huang Chen: Last Thursday, when Senators Mansfield and Scott invited me to lunch, they said they had invited Dr. Kissinger but Dr. Kissinger had not been able to attend.

Dr. Kissinger: I had just returned from Paris.

Huang Chen: Senator Mansfield mentioned this. He said there were various factors involved.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in favor of his going.

Huang Chen: Didn't you speak with him?

Dr. Kissinger: He mentioned last night that he was thinking of August. Why don't you just schedule it after mine?

Huang Chen: Have you preliminarily decided on the date of your visit?

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like a proposal? We will do it soon. I will make a proposal within a week. Maybe when you come to San Clemente. [Laughter]

I want to tell your Prime Minister that if by the time I get to Peking a cease-fire exists in Cambodia, I would be prepared to meet Prince Sihanouk to have political discussions. But it should not be announced in advance.

Huang Chen: I will convey this view of yours to the Prime Minister.

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In talking about the visit of Senator Mansfield, you mentioned the interest of Senator Jackson. We welcome him to go but we would welcome him to go with the present Congressional delegation.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister and Senator Jackson will get along very well. Another person who would like to go, whom the Prime Minister and I discussed, is Governor Rockefeller of New York.

Chi Chiao-chu: Nelson Rockefeller.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. David you know.

Huang Chen: I invited his brother to lunch.

Dr. Kissinger: He may be an important factor in 1976.

Huang Chen: David Rockefeller, at a luncheon with me, said his house in Maine is near Ambassador Watson's house.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Huang Chen: Ambassador Watson has invited me to visit Maine. So Mr. David Rockefeller invited me to visit him in Maine if I come to visit Watson in August. I don't know whether I can visit Maine in August because I don't know whether our housing situation will be solved by then.

On this subject, I would like to come to your suggestion. We have so far called upon various people in Washington, according to a list provided by the State Department. We called upon Senators Mansfield and Scott, the Vice President, and we will call on the Secretaries of Finance and Agriculture. So far there are many other friends who would like to contact us, but we have had to say we are busy. We would like to ask your advice of which friends we should visit.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have a list? We can give you our suggestions. Or we can give you our recommendations. In 48 hours.

Huang Chen: There is no need for such a hurry.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do it. But you are of course free to see anybody you like.

When you speak of friends, do you mean private people or people in government?

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Huang Chen: In government, or members of Congress or the Senate, or well-known personages.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make a list of recommendations for you.

Huang Chen: As for the list provided by the State Department, we told it to General Scowcroft over the phone.

Then about the call on the Vice President. I would like to tell you that the Vice President gave us a very friendly reception but didn't mention his wish to visit China as had been indicated by General Dunn.

Dr. Kissinger: We would like to defer that until we have settled the time of the visit by the President--and of the visit of the Prime Minister to America. [Laughter]

Huang Chen: These are all questions we should discuss in August.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe he should come on a secret visit. [Laughter]

Huang Chen: As I told Dr. Kissinger some time ago, as of my departure from Peking the Prime Minister had no plans to go abroad.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Have you any decision on whether you can visit us in San Clemente?

Huang Chen: Personally speaking, of course I would be happy to have the chance to visit you. But there still is some time.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. You can let us know. It would be better for us, actually, the week after next.

Huang Chen: The week after next. The beginning or the middle?

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to you. Next week the French Foreign Minister will visit me in San Clemente.

Huang Chen: Jobert.

Dr. Kissinger: Jobert. You know him! Very cynical and very intelligent. We are counting on the Prime Minister to help us with the European program when Pompidou comes [to Peking] in September.

Huang Chen: Mr. Pompidou is coming here? Or to China?

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Dr. Kissinger: China.

Huang Chen: Many questions will be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: On the meeting with Brezhnev, I don't know whether you know him, but he doesn't have the same precision of mind as your Prime Minister. So the President asked him yesterday if he wanted to make any opening remarks. He started, and 2-1/2 hours later he said he would make a brief conclusion, and then a 1/2 hour later he finished his opening remarks. [Laughter] And they were very emotional and very general. And really less precise than what I had already told you from Zavidovo.

His basic strategy is to attempt to prove there are no differences left between the United States and the Soviet Union and that there is total solidarity on a global basis.

Huang Chen: So he thinks there is a relationship of partnership, as he said.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the impression he is trying to create. But that is not our policy. On very practical grounds it makes no sense to support the stronger against the weaker. And we will not do anything practical to support that policy.

Huang Chen: I don't know this man personally. I only know Gromyko.

Dr. Kissinger: Gromyko is very precise. But Brezhnev is very emotional. And very brutal. I will give you a full report as the discussions develop.

Huang Chen: You mentioned there are three paragraphs you wanted him to delete.

Dr. Kissinger: I will send them to you this afternoon. They don't mention China but it is obvious. They sent us over a text, and we said it was inappropriate to deliver at the White House. It is not exactly according to protocol, Mr. Minister. [Laughter]

I will in any event try to see you before we leave, but if you come to San Clemente we can have a long talk. And we will arrange housing for you when you are there.

Huang Chen: How many hours will it take?

Dr. Kissinger: If you wanted to, you could use one of our planes. But about 4-1/2 hours. You are welcome to stay as long as you can. It can be

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done in two days. It can be done in one day but it is very exhausting. You should stay one night. If you think it is appropriate, I could invite some California friends for a dinner with you.

Huang Chen: Certainly if I go I would be happy to have dinner with you. And I thank you in advance for arranging if I go.

You are very busy, so I won't keep you.

[The meeting then ended.]

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Attachment 1:

On June 14, 1973, the Soviet Foreign Minister met with the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, proposing that China and the Soviet Union conclude a treaty of non-aggression, and handing us a copy of the draft treaty.

As the U.S. side is aware, the Soviet Union had in the past proposed the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual non-use of force, which was rejected by the Chinese side. As the present draft treaty put forward by the Soviet side is, in essence, not different from its past proposal, the Chinese side will not agree to it. Logically, since there is already a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" between China and the Soviet Union, which, though trampled under foot by the Soviet side, is not abrogated, would it not be tantamount to open negation of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, if such a "treaty of non-aggression" were to be concluded on top of it? Moreover, the Chinese and Soviet Premiers reached in September 1969 an understanding to the effect that, in order to relax the tension and to ensure that the Sino-Soviet boundary question could be settled through negotiations free from any threats, the two sides should first of all reach an agreement on the provisional measures for maintaining the status quo of the border, averting armed conflicts and disengaging armed forces of the two sides in the disputed areas along the border. Through over three years of prolonged negotiations, the Soviet side has all along obstructed the signing of this agreement, and now in proposing the conclusion of such a "treaty of non-aggression", it is in fact aimed at heading off the agreement on the provisional measures. The purpose of the Soviet proposition

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is obviously not for the settlement of the actual issues existing between China and the Soviet Union, but for covering up these issues, deceiving the people and fooling the public opinion. In putting forward its proposal right on the eve of Brezhnev's departure for the United States, the Soviet motive is crystal clear to all. It is believed that the U.S. side is also aware of it.

Now we would like to provide the U.S. side with a copy of the "draft treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and China" proposed by the Soviet side, for its reference.